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The U.S. current account deficit has attracted considerable attention from academics, policymakers and market participants. So
also has the U.S. international investment position—the difference
between U.S.-owned assets abroad and foreign-owned assets in
the United States. The net position has become increasingly negative as current account deficits have accumulated over time. I have
spoken on international topics several times in recent years, emphasizing the importance of international capital flows for explaining the evolution of the U.S. international accounts. I’ll review
some of my prior analysis today, but want to concentrate on the
question in my title.
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The question arises because, at some point in the future, the
world economy will adjust in ways that yield a smaller U.S. current account deficit. That we know for certain, because a situation
in which the U.S. net international investment position becomes
ever more negative as a percentage of GDP is inconsistent with
long-run equilibrium. So, the question is not whether the U.S. current account deficit will fall in the future but whether the inevitable
adjustment is likely to be painful and disruptive of U.S. economic
growth and stability—a hard landing.
My answer is that a hard landing is very unlikely provided that
U.S. monetary and fiscal authorities maintain sound policies. The
Federal Reserve needs to pursue policies that yield low inflation

and financial stability and the federal government needs to pursue
policies that yield fiscal balance in the long run. I believe the current account adjustment will be fairly slow and orderly, and that it
may not begin for quite some time.
My answer is also based on a simple observation, which I believe is not widely understood. For the United States, unlike almost every other country in the world, a hard-landing process is
inherently self-limiting. U.S. assets owned by international investors are predominantly denominated in dollars and a large fraction
of U.S. assets held abroad are denominated in foreign currencies.
Dollar depreciation, should it occur in a hard-landing process, will
be self-limiting because the dollar value of U.S. assets abroad will
rise, thus improving the U.S. net international investment position.
Market participants, knowing this fact, are therefore unlikely to
drive down the foreign currency value of the dollar in a rapid and
disruptive fashion.
I’ll proceed in two steps. First, I’ll explore the fundamentals
of the U.S. position, emphasizing the central role of international
capital flows in creating the current account deficit. Second, I’ll
develop the theme that the U.S. position is self-correcting, should
a hard-landing process begin.
Before proceeding, I want to emphasize that the views I express
here are mine and do not necessarily reflect official positions of
the Federal Reserve System. Two members of the St. Louis Fed’s
Research Division, Cletus Coughlin, Vice President, and Mike
Pakko, Senior Economist, provided special assistance. However, I
retain full responsibility for errors.

Preliminaries
The most widely cited measure of the U.S. external imbalance is
the trade deficit—the difference between U.S. exports and imports
of goods and services. More generally, it is useful to consider
the broader concept of the current account, which includes current
earnings on capital as well as trade in goods and services. A corresponding account on the other side of the ledger, known as the
“Capital and Financial Account,” measures the international flow
of capital assets. Putting aside errors and omissions in the data, a
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current account deficit is necessarily equal to a capital account surplus. A country in this position—like the United States today—is
exporting more capital claims than it is importing. Put another
way, international investors are bringing more capital to the United
States than U.S. investors are sending abroad.
A common mistake is to treat international capital flows as though
they are passively responding to what is happening in the current
account. The current account deficit, some say, is financed by U.S.
borrowing abroad. In fact, international investors buy U.S. assets
not for the purpose of financing the U.S. current account deficit
but because they believe these are sound investments promising a
good combination of safety and return. Moreover, many of these
investments have nothing whatsoever to do with borrowing in the
conventional meaning of the word, but instead involve purchases
of land, businesses, and common stock in the United States. Foreign auto companies, for example, have purchased land and built
manufacturing plants in the United States. Clearly, foreign auto
producers have established these facilities because of the prospective returns from building vehicles in the United States and not
for the purpose of financing the U.S. current account deficit. This
simple example should make clear that a careful analysis of the
nature of international capital flows is necessary before offering
judgments about risks posed by the U.S. current account deficit.

Recent Trends in the U.S.
International Investment Position
The capital account measures asset flows of a country for a given period, such as a year. For the United States, the capital account
includes the accumulation of foreign assets by U.S. residents as
well as the accumulation of U.S. assets by foreigners.
As trade and commerce around the world have grown increasingly integrated—the process often referred to as “globalization”—the growth of cross border financial flows has become
particularly prominent. For example, foreign-owned U.S. assets
increased by an average of $155 billion per year during the 1980s.
For the years 2000 through 2004, foreign ownership of U.S. assets
increased at an average rate of $991 billion per year—more than
a six fold increase. In 2004, over $1.4 trillion of U.S. assets were
purchased by foreign entities.
U.S. ownership of foreign assets has shown similar growth. Averaging $95 billion per year during the 1980s, U.S. entities have
accumulated foreign assets at an average rate of $484 billion per
year over the past five years. Over the entire span of this comparison, accumulation of U.S. assets by international investors has outpaced the U.S. accumulation of foreign assets—a capital account
surplus that has moved our country from a positive to a negative
net asset position.
Prior to 1989, the United States had had a positive net international investment position since World War I. As a consequence of
large capital inflows in the 1990s, the United States today has the
world’s largest negative net international investment position. By
the end of 2004, foreigners owned more than $12.5 trillion of U.S.
assets, based on market values, while U.S.-owned assets abroad
reached a level of just under $10 trillion. Hence, at the end of last
year, the U.S. net international investment position was minus $2.5
trillion, amounting to over 20 percent of U.S. GDP.
In today’s world, with electronic funds transfers, financial derivatives and largely unrestricted capital flows, investors have a
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global marketplace in which to seek profitable returns and diversify risk. In such an environment, we should consider the possibility
that aggregate patterns of international trade flows may be the by
product of a process through which financial resources are seeking their most efficient allocations in a worldwide capital market.
That is, instead of thinking that capital flows are financing the current account deficit, it may well be that the trade deficit is driven
by—is financing, so to speak—capital flows determined by investors seeking the best combination of risk and return in the international capital market. The mechanism creating this outcome is that
capital inflows keep the dollar stronger than it otherwise would be,
tending to boost imports and suppress exports, thus leading to a
current account deficit.
While the conclusion that the current account is financing the
capital account is surely an overstatement, because capital and
trade flows are jointly determined, it is worth emphasizing that
capital flows are a highly dynamic feature of the world economy.
Capital flows are driven by a number of economic forces which are
not fully understood, especially at a quantitative level. The “home
bias” of investors, which has led them to invest in their home
countries rather than seek optimal international diversification,
has probably been diminishing and as a consequence investors everywhere are increasingly investing outside their home countries.
Countries with rapidly aging populations, especially Japan and
Western European ones, may be saving and investing in the United States against the day when their populations will be drawing
down assets to support retired citizens. Because the United States
economy has been growing at a faster pace than most high-income
counties, investment returns from U.S. operations have tended to
exceed those abroad, thus encouraging capital flows to the United
States.
As many have commented, the capital inflow may also reflect
the low saving rate in the United States. However, the U.S. saving rate should not be viewed in isolation: Ben Bernanke—a former Fed Governor, current Chairman of the President’s Council
of Economic Advisors and President Bush’s nominee to succeed
Alan Greenspan as Federal Reserve Chairman—has persuasively
argued that an unusually high level of worldwide savings relative
to investment opportunities has resulted in downward pressure on
world interest rates. Investors everywhere seek the best combination of investment return and security, and they have brought
abundant capital to the United States because the profitability and
security of U.S. investment opportunities make the United States
something of an oasis of prosperity and stability.
Some of these economic forces may tend to reduce U.S. capital
inflows in the future. For example, as portfolios become more
internationally diversified the incentive for investors abroad to
move capital to the United States will diminish. Aging populations may increase purchases of U.S. goods with their accumulated
assets. The net of these economic forces in the future may tend to
either appreciate or depreciate the value of the dollar on foreign
exchange markets.
But one thing is clear: Changes in investor attitudes and expectations can alter capital flows quickly and force changes in the trade
account. From this perspective, which I have called the “international capital markets view,” international asset markets play a
central role. Capital flows, determined by the motivations of foreign and domestic investors, are a driving force. We should think
of capital flows as the equilibrium outcome of investors worldwide
seeking to acquire portfolios that balance risk and return through

diversification.
When we bear this perspective in mind—that international
capital flows are determined by investors’ efforts to allocate their
capital most efficiently and not by passive financing of the current
account—prospects for a painful current account adjustment in the
future seem less likely. The fundamental economic determinants
of capital flows are unlikely to change quickly and massively, and
therefore capital flows themselves are unlikely to change quickly
and massively.

the types of adjustments that take place in market economies in
response to evolving supply and demand conditions. The recent
depreciation of the dollar can be seen as part of the normal adjustment process of the economy and markets have not shown any
signs of becoming disorderly.
An emphasis on savings and investment as drivers of international capital flows appears incomplete and not completely in accord with recent facts. What is needed, I believe, is a more explicit
focus on the unique role of U.S. financial markets in the world
economy.

A Consideration of the
Potential Dangers

The U.S. Role in International
Capital Markets

The potential dangers of current account adjustments can be
viewed from a number of perspectives. As we consider some of
these scenarios, the international capital markets view will serve to
counter some of the concerns.
Many of those who predict adverse consequences of a current
account reversal emphasize the risk of a dramatic depreciation of
the dollar on foreign exchange markets. If this decline were to
take place suddenly, resulting in disorderly markets, a financialmarket induced recession might ensue. To properly evaluate the
likelihood of this kind of worst-case scenario, we need to consider
some alternative views of the forces driving the U.S. current account deficit in the first place.

The globalization of financial markets—spurred by technological advances and liberalization of capital flow restrictions worldwide—has created entirely new investment opportunities for investors in both the United States and abroad. These new opportunities
have undoubtedly given rise to a re-balancing of portfolios, and
there are reasons to believe that this process might be associated
with a net export of claims on U.S. assets, yielding a current account deficit.
U.S. financial markets are among the most highly developed in
the world, offering efficiency, transparency and liquidity. The U.S.
dollar serves as both a medium of exchange and a unit of account
in many international transactions. These factors make dollar denominated claims attractive assets in any international portfolio.
No capital market in the world has a combination of strengths superior to that of the United States. Our advantages include the
promise of a good return, safety, secure political institutions, liquidity and an enormous depth of financial expertise.
For some purposes, it is useful to think of U.S. financial markets
as serving as a world financial intermediary. Just as a bank, or
a mutual fund, channels the savings of many individuals toward
productive investments, the U.S. financial markets play a similar
role for many investors from around the world. In the process,
individuals, companies, and governments accumulate dollar-denominated assets to serve as a vehicle for facilitating transactions
and storing liquid wealth safely.
A bank earns its return on capital by paying a lower interest rate
to depositors than it earns on its assets. Similarly, the United States
earns a higher return on its investments abroad than foreigners do
on their investments in the United States. Despite the fact that the
U.S. international investment position at the end of 2004 was $2.5
trillion, U.S. net income in 2004 on its investments abroad slightly
exceeded income payments on foreign-owned assets in the United
States. This pattern has been the norm for a number of years but,
obviously, the net income flow will become negative if the U.S. net
international investment position becomes sufficiently negative.
How is the United States able to earn a significantly higher return on its assets abroad than foreigners earn on their assets in the
United States? Consider currency, which pays a zero return. A
remarkable fact is that about half the total amount of U.S. currency
outstanding is circulating abroad. Another fact is that much of the
foreign holding of U.S. debt is in the form of Treasury bills and
other debt instruments, while U.S. residents hold a much larger
share of their assets abroad in the form of equities, thus earning an
equity premium.
More generally, many private and governmental investors

Floor seating only for some students at the
11th Economic Policy Lecture Series.
From a trade deficit view, which I do not share, depreciation of
the dollar on foreign exchange markets might be seen as necessary
to resolve the excess of U.S. imports over exports. On this view,
either the United States will run a persistently widening current
account deficit, or we are destined to face some combination of a
depreciating currency and/or lower GDP growth. If we look at the
situation from the opposite direction, however, we might note that
the recent historical trend of a widening U.S. current account deficit has taken place in an environment in which U.S. GDP growth
has been, on average, higher than growth in much of the rest of the
world.
Indeed, we did see some depreciation of the dollar from early
2002 through 2004, by a bit less than 30 percent as measured by
the major-currencies trade-weighted index. However, the index
has rebounded by about 6 percent so far in 2005. The depreciation,
on balance, since 2002 has made U.S. exports more competitive
and has led to some price increases in U.S. imports. These are
3

abroad rely on the U.S. capital market as the best place to invest
in extremely safe and highly liquid securities. Along a spectrum
of safety and liquidity, these assets include currency, U.S. government obligations, agency debt, and corporate bonds. U.S. equity
markets are also highly liquid. The United States as a whole earns
a return from providing these safe and liquid investments to the
world. The desire of foreigners to hold U.S. Treasury securities is
a testament to the confidence that the world has in the safety and
soundness of our financial system.
Part of the reason U.S. capital markets have unrivaled strength
in the world economy is that U.S. financial institutions provide services of extremely high quality. In the detailed trade accounts, we
see that the United States has a lopsided trade advantage in financial services. In 2004, U.S. exports of financial services amounted
to $21.9 billion, against imports of such services of only $5.0 billion. Another line in the table of trade statistics tells the same
story: business, professional and technical services yielded U.S.
export earnings in 2004 of $33.8 billion as against imports of such
services $12.5 billion. Some of these services, such as legal and
accounting services, are closely connected to success in financial
services trade.

How Dangerous Is the U.S. Current
Account Deficit?
In light of these considerations, let us return to our question:
“How dangerous is the U.S. current account deficit? The first
thing to note is that many of the economic forces driving capital
flows are very long term. Portfolio reallocations occur as home
bias declines, but over years rather than quarters. Firms build operations in other countries based on plans extending many years
in the future. Demographic developments unfold over decades.
What may appear to be an imbalance from a short-run perspective
may make perfect sense over a long-term horizon.
To the extent that adjustment of the current account will involve
changes in the foreign exchange value of the dollar, it is quite likely that such changes will take place gradually over time in orderly
markets. There is no inherent reason that such changes would lead
to a financial market crisis; as a stable, diversified and growing
economy, the United States is not likely to suffer from a sudden
lack of confidence by investors. Of course, sustained confidence
does depend on sound economic policies, as I have already emphasized.
It is sometimes said that the United States has become a “net
debtor” nation, and that this situation increases the risk that currency depreciation might lead to financial crisis. Indeed, with a
current account deficit amounting to 6 percent of GDP and a negative net international investment position over 20 percent of GDP,
some have drawn comparisons with countries such as Argentina,
Brazil, Mexico and other countries that at times have experienced
severe balance-of-payments crises. I consider it highly unlikely
that such a crisis will befall the United States.
The word “debtor” is extremely misleading in this context, for
the U.S. assets owned by foreigners include equities and physical
capital located in the United States, in addition to bonds issued by
U.S. entities. Moreover, the part of the U.S. international financial
position that is debt, by which I mean bonds and other fixed claims
such as bank loans, is predominantly denominated in dollars. In
fact, about 95 percent of international claims on the United States
4

are denominated in dollars. A country with most of its debt denominated in its own currency is in a very different situation from
one whose debt is denominated in other currencies. The familiar
crises experienced by several Asian countries in 1997-98, by Mexico on several occasions, and by numerous other countries have all
involved situations in which the impacted countries have had large
external debts denominated in foreign currencies.
In these previous crisis scenarios, the foreign denomination of
domestic debt had important destabilizing consequences. Consider what typically happens to a country suffering a balance-ofpayments crisis. As the foreign exchange value of its currency depreciates, the value of its foreign liabilities—in terms of domestic
purchasing power—increases, as does the burden of servicing its
international debt. Recognizing this implication of a crisis, international investors respond by paring back their positions further,
engendering even greater currency depreciation. Hence, the combination of foreign-denominated debt and a depreciating currency
has proven to be something of a vicious cycle—compounding and
accelerating a crisis.
The U.S. situation is completely different. To the extent that
the foreign exchange value of the dollar declines, the effect on the
values of U.S. and foreign asset holdings works not as an accelerator of crisis, but as part of a self-correcting mechanism. Dollardenominated U.S. liabilities remain unchanged in domestic value,
which means that debt service in dollars and relative to the size of
the U.S. economy does not change. Moreover, holdings of U.S.
investors abroad, about two-thirds of which are denominated in
foreign currencies, appreciate in dollar terms. The composition of
the U.S. international investment account, therefore, contributes to
stability rather than to instability.
The significant quantitative importance of exchange rate changes
on the U.S. net international investment position can be illustrated by examining specific periods in which the dollar appreciated
or depreciated. Consider the years 2002-2004, during which the
Fed’s major currencies trade-weighted exchange rate index depreciated by nearly 27 percent. Associated with the current account
deficits during this period were financial flows into the United
States totaling $1.6 trillion. However, because foreign claims on
U.S. assets are denominated in dollars to a far greater extent than
U.S. claims on foreign assets, the depreciation increased the dollar
value of U.S. assets abroad relative to foreign assets in the United
States. The total valuation impact stemming from exchange rate
changes was $919.0 billion, which was 57 percent of the net financial flows. For this three-year period, the U.S. net international
investment position decreased by $202.8 billion, but absent the
exchange rate adjustment, the position would have decreased by
more than $1.1 trillion.
Now consider the years 1999-2001, to illustrate the impact of an
appreciating dollar. During this period, the Fed’s major currencies
trade-weighted exchange rate index showed a dollar appreciation
of nearly 15 percent. Net financial flows into the United States
totaled $1.1 trillion. Meanwhile, the total valuation impact of the
appreciating dollar was a negative $548.2 billion, which is nearly
half the size of the net financial flows. For this three-year period,
the U.S. net international investment position decreased by $1.3
trillion. Absent the exchange rate adjustment, the decrease would
have been $684.4 billion. However, the negative international investment position did not threaten to cause dollar depreciation; instead, causation went the other way, as dollar appreciation caused
a significant increase in the negative net investment position.

The effects of changes in the foreign exchange value of the dol- the world economy suggests that capital account surpluses, and
lar on the U.S. net international investment position serve to sta- therefore current account deficits, are being driven primarily by
bilize the international sector of the U.S. economy. Clearly, as foreign demand for U.S. assets rather than any structural imbalthe previous illustrations show, it is a mistake to ignore valuation ance in the U.S. economy itself.
changes because they are not insignificant compared to the annual
The situation facing the United States is deeply different from
financial flows that are the counterpart of the current account defi- that facing nations that have experienced painful current account
cit.
adjustments. But while the U.S. situation might be quite distincCertain other industrialized economies have incurred much larg- tive, it would be a mistake to think that the United States is in
er external obligations as a percent of GDP without precipitating completely uncharted waters; as noted, other prosperous countries
crises. For example, Australia’s negative net investment position have had large negative international investment positions without
reached 60 percent of GDP in the mid-1990s, Ireland’s exceeded getting into trouble, and the United States itself was in this position
70 percent in the 1980s, and New Zealand accumulated a position for decades prior to World War I.
amounting to nearly 90 percent of GDP in the late 1990s. Notably,
these economies have recently been among the most successful—
Concluding Comments
in terms of economic growth—in the industrialized world. The
combination of rising external obligations and prospects for robust
The international financial markets view of U.S. international
growth is entirely consistent with the view of the capital account capital account determination that I have described today highlights
I have discussed today. Capital flows to countries that can make the dynamic role of international capital adjustments as investors
productive use of it. Capital inflow is a symptom of good growth exploit the opportunities of globalized financial markets. Because
prospects and an aid to growth rather than an impediment.
the technological progress and capital-market liberalizations that
A recent study by Federal Reserve economists at the Board of have driven this process have evolved over time, the process has
Governors buttresses this view.
been protracted. Ultimately, howThe authors of the study—Croke,
ever, when portfolio adjustments
Kamin, and Leduc—systematihave optimally exploited new dically examined examples of deversification opportunities, and
veloped industrial nations that
as growth abroad rises, the net
have experienced current account
international investment position
“reversals.” They found that such
of the United States will stabilize.
reversals have typically been beSo also, over time, will the current
nign: among those countries that
account deficit decline to sustainexperienced the largest declines
able levels.
in growth during the adjustment
If the capital markets view is
period, cyclical considerations apcorrect—and I obviously think
peared to be an important factor.
it is--the forces driving the U.S.
Moreover, these cases were generDr. Poole holds press interview after lecture.
capital account represent a perally not associated with significant
sistent, but ultimately temporary,
exchange rate depreciations. Among those cases where countries process that might result in a higher negative level of net claims
weathered the adjustment while experiencing increasing economic without necessarily posing any threat to the long-run sustainability
growth, exchange rate adjustments were an important factor in of the U.S. current account. Nor will the transition to a sustainreducing current account deficits—primarily by raising export able long-run path necessarily require wrenching adjustments in
growth rather than lowering imports. In these cases, the exchange domestic or international markets or in exchange rates.
rate depreciation evidently played a role in buffering those econoWe can all benefit from our good fortune in having access to
mies against adverse growth consequences.
increasingly safe, liquid, and transparent financial markets. The
These findings provide little evidence in support of the disorderly United States has created for itself a comparative advantage in
markets scenario, and are entirely consistent with the view I have capital markets, and we should not be surprised that investors all
emphasized. To be sure, no country can permanently incur rising over the world come to buy the product.
levels of net external obligations relative to GDP. If sustained indefinitely, service payments on ever-increasing obligations would
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